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Abstract: We show that partially trusting the phase noise associated with estimation 
uncertainty in a LLO-CVQKD system allows one to exchange higher secure key rates than in 
the case of untrusted phase noise. However, this opens a security loophole through the 
manipulation of the reference pulse amplitude. We label this as ‘reference pulse attack’ which 
is applicable to all LLO-CVQKD systems if the phase noise is trusted. We show that, at the 
optimal reference pulse intensity level, Eve achieves unity attack efficiency at 23.8km and 
32.0km while using lossless and 0.14dB/km loss channels, respectively, for her attack. 
However, in order to maintain the performance enhancement from partially trusting the phase 
noise, countermeasures have been proposed. As a result, the LLO-CVQKD system with 
partially trusted phase noise owns a superior key rate at 20km by an order 9.5, and extended 
transmission distance by 45%, than that of the phase noise untrusted system. 
© 2018 Optical Society of America under the terms of the OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement 
1. Introduction 
The aim of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to promise theoretically validated information 
security between two authenticated users, Alice and Bob. This is achieved by sharing 
common random secure keys which are unknown to an eavesdropper-Eve [1-4]. Continuous 
Variable (CV) based QKD has rapidly developed in recent years [5-7] and its protocols take 
advantage of the properties of light associated with its wave nature. Here keys are encoded on 
amplitude and phase jointly referred as quadrature, of the light which can be extracted by shot 
noise limited coherent detection.  The primary advantage of CVQKD is its compatibility with 
standard off-the-shelf optical communication components which could enable more 
affordable QKD networks [8]. In addition, while comparing with dedicated single-photon 
detector based discrete variable (DV) QKD systems, CVQKD systems are efficient and have 
higher secure key rates over access and metro dense wavelength division multiplexed 
(DWDM) networks [9-11]. Amongst number of CVQKD protocols, Gaussian-modulated 
coherent-state (GMCS) CVQKD having been rigorously studied and shown to provide 
unconditional security against malicious eavesdropping attacks [12,13]. However, 
imperfections in real CVQKD systems result in potential loopholes that compromise the 
secure key generation. For example, attacks that exploit the intensity fluctuations of the local 
oscillator (LO) [14], the wavelength dependency of the homodyne beam splitter [15], and the 
saturation of the homodyne detector [16] have been identified and respective counter 
measures have been proposed. 
The Local Local Oscillator (LLO) CVQKD system, proposed and demonstrated in [17-
19], obviates the need for direct transmission of a LO and thereby nullifies the scope for 
direct or indirect attacks on the LO. This is achieved by using independent narrow linewidth 
lasers of the same center wavelength, one at Alice for signal generation and the other at Bob 
for local oscillator use. However, agreeing a common phase reference between the two free 
running lasers is an experimental challenge. In order to ease such a limitation, Alice can share 
low intensity phase reference pulses with Bob,  that can either lock the phase of  the LO laser 
with the one at Alice in real time [20] or otherwise can recover the phase and corrects the 
measurements later during data reconciliation [21]. The latest LLO implementations based 
simultaneous pilot’s signals [22], polarization multiplexed pilots [23] and more detailed noise 
analysis [24] also comes to the stage. 
Due to the relatively low intensity, the quantum uncertainty associated with the reference 
pulse’s phase estimation induces a phase estimation error in Bob’s quadrature measurement. 
The phase drift due to the laser spectral linewidth also contributes to the phase noise. 
Conventionally, in order to upper bound the information leakage, it is assumed that phase 
noise is originated from Eve.  This may not be necessary since some part of the phase noise 
sources can be well identified, calibrated and hence trusted i.e., they are not originated from 
eavesdropping. 
 A refined noise model to enhance the phase noise tolerance in LLO-CVQKD has recently 
been studied in [25] where phase estimation error noise can be locally calibrated and treated 
as trusted noise while the phase drift noise is still regarded as untrusted. In this model, 
significant increment in achievable secret key rate and transmission distance has been 
predicted [17, 21]. Moreover, in [23], we find that the phase variation arise from signal and 
pilot pulses separation inside Bob is also isolated from Eve, hence certain trusted phase noise 
and predicted improved performance. Nevertheless, security analysis with trusted phase noise 
has not been comprehensively investigated and we have therefore found that amplitude-
related phase estimation error noise can result in a loophole for Eve to mount an attack. 
In this paper, we explore LLO-CVQKD system performance under trusted- referred as 
realistic, and untrusted- referred as paranoid, security model of phase noise and show the 
enhancement in secure key rate. And then propose an attack that exploits the phase estimation 
error associated with the amplitude of the phase reference pulses. The corresponding 
reduction in phase estimation error leave freedom for Eve to obtain a considerably larger 
amount of secret key information than that estimated by Alice and Bob, under realistic 
security model. We call this attack the “reference pulse attack”. In the proposed 
countermeasure, we re-visit the phase noise that can be trusted conditioned on the amount of 
attack that Eve can mount and then bound her accessible information. As a result, 
performance is degraded but is better than that of paranoid security model. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we briefly describe the LLO-CVQKD 
system and demonstrate assumption of the trusted phase noise model and performance. In 
section III, we present the reference pulse attack and we revisit the expression for the mutual 
information under the reference pulse attack. In section IV, we compare the attack 
performance under the paranoid and realistic security conditions. We then optimize the 
trusted phase noise model to provide a countermeasure to the attack. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn in section V. 
2. The LLO CVQKD System 
In this section, we describe the implementation of the LLO-CVQKD system and the current 
state-of-art noise model. We focus on the phase noise, especially the phase estimation error 
noise, to reveal the loophole.  
2.1 LLO CVQKD principle 
As shown in Fig. 1, a practical LLO-CVQKD system using the GMCS protocol can be 
analysed in four parts: Alice’s preparation, channel propagation, Bob’s detection and data 
post processing.  
First of all, Alice prepares a train of Gaussian modulated coherent signal states Aα with 
quadrature AX  and AP  with variance AV  and zero mean. Then she transmits these coherent 
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This follows the generally accepted trusted detector noise assumption in practical CVQKD 
system [24-26]. Meanwhile, estiξ is determined at the trusted detector and can be locally 
calibrated at Bob. To achieve pre-calibration, one can use training pulse sessions, as used in 
classical coherent communications, to estimate total noise and then the calibration of phase 
estimation noise which can assumed to be constant during the protocol run. Therefore, estiξ is 
assumed as trusted detector noise. However, it is hard to verify the randomness of phase drift 
noise driftξ associated with two independent lasers [22] so it is assumed as untrusted noise. 
Based on these two assumptions, the quadrature values measured by Bob under trusted phase 
noise can be written as: 
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
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 (7) 
NX and NP  are vacuum quadratures with unit shot noise variance ( 0N ). eleX and eleP  are 
electronic noise quadratures with variance eleV . In the Eq. (7), the rotation matrix in the first 
term accounts for the phase estimation error while the Xξ  and Pξ  represent the noise due to 
Eve’s attack.  
2.3 Trusted phase noise model performance analysis 
Secret key formula pertaining to the LLO-CVQKD scheme follows exactly that for a 
conventional CVQKD scheme. Under a collective attack [3] with reverse reconciliation, the 
asymptotic secure key rate is: 
collective AB BEK Iβ χ= − (8) 
Where β is the reconciliation efficiency and ABI  is the mutual information between Alice and 
Bob while BEχ  is the upper bound of Eve’s information related to the Holevo bound [27]. 
Before we detail the Eq.8 further, we describe the noise nomenclatures used in its expansion.  
This is important to comprehend the basic difference in the key rate estimation under trusted 
and untrusted noise model. The trusted phase noise model does not change any derivation 
procedure rather attribute the trusted noise differently in the parameters involved. This as 
follows. 
As mentioned in previous section, the phase estimation error noise estiξ  in trusted phase 
noise model is treated as part of the trusted detector noise hetε  while the rest of phase noise – 
phase drift noise driftξ  and other noises such as AM dynamic range related noise AMξ  [21] 
and ADC quantization noise ADCξ  [23] are untrusted. The trusted phase noise model does not 
change the estimation procedure of the eigenvalues. Based on the heterodyne detection for 
reference and signals, the noise induced by detector under such noise model is expressed as:  
߯ℎ݁ݐܶ =
ሾ1 + (1 − ߟ) + 2ܸ݈݁݁ሿ
ߟ + ܶ estiξ  (9) 
The total line noise induced in channel containing all untrusted noise referred to channel 
input is  
߯lineT =
1
ܶ − 1 + eξ + driftξ + AMξ + ADCξ (10) 
      In comparison, overall phase noise is considered to be controlled by Eve in 
conventional paranoid security model and estiξ  is treated as part of excess noise. Therefore, 
the channel ulineχ and the heterodyne detection noise u hetε , u stands for untrusted, can be 
obtained as: 
߯୪୧୬ୣ୳ = ߯୪୧୬ୣ୘ + estiξ  (11) 
        ߯hetu = ߯ℎ݁ݐܶ − ܶ estiξ  (12) 
The overall noise referred to the channel input, in trusted noise model, is shown: 
	χ௧௢௧ = ߯௟௜௡௘ +
߯௛௘௧
ܶ  (13) 
This is also true for untrusted noise case. From the Shannon equation [28], ܫ஺஻  with 
heterodyne detection can be derived through: 
 I୅୆ = logଶ ஻ܸ
஻ܸ|஺
= logଶ
ܸ + ߯௧௢௧
1 + ߯௧௢௧    (14) 
Furthermore, the accessed information by Eve χ୆୉ is evaluated using the Von Neumann 
entropy S(.) [29]: 
 χ୆୉ = ܵ(ܧ) − ܵ(ܧ|ܤ)     (15) 
For the GMCS protocol, the Von Neumann entropy is analysed using the symplectic 
eigenvalues [30-31] of the covariance matrix. The derivation χ୆୉	 in LLO-CVQKD system 
[17] follows exactly same as that of conventional CV-QKD, with added phase noise from 
reference pulse as well as laser phase drift. In our estimation, since we have considered the 
phase estimation error noise is trusted and part of detection noise, it is adequate to follow the 
same procedure. The mutual information between Eve and Bob is given by: 
 χ୆୉ =෍ܩ ൬
ߣ௜ − 1
2 ൰ − ෍ܩ ൬
ߣ௜ − 1
2 ൰
ହ
௜ୀଷ
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
     (16) 
where G(x) = (x + 1) logଶ(x + 1) − xlogଶx		and the eigenvalues	λଵ,ଶ = ටଵଶ ൫ܣ ± √ܣଶ − 4ܤ൯	 
with  
A = ܸଶ(1 − 2ܶ) + 2ܶ + ܶଶ(ܸ + ߯௟௜௡௘)ଶ    (17) 
B = ሾT(Vχ୪୧୬ୣ + 1)ሿଶ (18) 
Considering that heterodyne detection, λଷ,ସ,ହ , can be written 
by	λଷ,ସ = ටଵଶ ൫ܥ ± √ܥଶ − 4ܦ൯ and λହ = 1 with 
C = ଵ൫்(௏ାఞ೟೚೟)൯మ ቂܣ߯௛௘௧
ଶ + ܤ + 1 + 2߯௛௘௧ ቀܸ√ܤ + ܶ(ܸ + ߯௟௜௡௘)ቁ + 2ܶ(ܸଶ − 1)ቃ             (19)                
D = ቀ୚ା√୆ఞ೓೐೟்(௏ାఞ೟೚೟)ቁ
ଶ
  (20) 
The simulation for performance comparison is conducted with parameters selected to 
match with the parameters used in recent LLO-CVQKD experiments [17,19], which are: 
V୅ = 4 , 	ߚ = 0.95 , ߟ = 0.5 ,attenuation coefficient 	αୱ୲ୢ = 0.2	dB/km , Vୣ୪ୣୡ = 0.01 , ξୣ =
0.01, f୰ୣ୮ = 100	MHz, ߂ݒ = 1.9݇ܪݖ, AM extinction ratio is 40dB and quantization number 
of  the ADC is 11 bits. Among this parameter, most importantly, the intensity of reference 
pulse needs to be chosen carefully to achieve the best system performance. Too weak 
reference pulse intensity will introduce large phase noise due to shot noise. On the other hand, 
even though large reference pulse intensity leads to low phase estimation error noise. 
However, other noises such as modulation noise due to finite amplitude modulation range and 
polarization multiplexing device’s dynamic range [25], ADC noise [23], etc. will 
correspondingly increase with reference pulse intensity. The best performance under 
untrusted phase noise model is around the intensity that expressed in signal variance is 
	୉౎మ୚ఽ = 100~150 in LLO-CVQKD system.  We set  
୉౎మ
୚ఽ = 100 is as the optimal value in our 
comparison; also used in ref [25].   
As the results shown in Fig. 3, since the trusted phase noise is not regarded as part of the 
excess noise, it has significantly improved key rate and distance performance to 99.8km.  The 
paranoid security model usually overestimates excess noise, hence Eve’s information, 
resulting in extremely limited system performance to 18.7km.  This indicates that relaxations 
on existing stringent security assumption will lead to better QKD system performance.  
However, this security assumptions may open new vulnerabilities and potential side channels. 
Here is no difference; we have identified an attack in trusted LLO-CVQKD system. We 
explain this in the following section.  
 
Fig. 3. Secret key rate comparison of the realistic and paranoid security noise model. The 
simulation parameters are selected to match the parameters used in recent LLO-CVQKD 
experiments [17]. Alice modulation variance VA =4 and reference pulse intensity	Eଶୖ/V୅ =
100 
 
3. Reference pulse attack under trusted phase noise 
3.1 Reference pulse attack model 
In CVQKD, the parameter estimation procedure allows Alice to estimate only the overall 
excess noise totξ  value as a single parameter value. It has contributions from several 
individual noise sources which are practically impossible to distinguish. Consequently, the 
variation in the noise contribution from individual noise sources cannot be detected if the totξ  
is kept unchanged. We exploit this vulnerability to propose the reference pulse attack. This 
attack is focused on LLO-CVQKD system with trusted phase noise where the phase noise 
value is calibrated in advance. 
The fundamental plan of the reference pulse attack is to manipulate the individual excess 
noise contributions without altering totξ . The attack works as follows. Eve increase her 
amount of attack on the quantum signal, which inevitably increase the excess noise. However, 
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estimation of the noise margin available to Eve from the reduction of phase estimation error 
noise that is associated with the amplitude of the reference pulse. From the Eq. (6), the 
reduced phase estimation error noise  attackestiξ  can be evaluated as: 
 
2
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* *
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attack stdtot std
esti A esti
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Ref
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T TE
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χξ ξη
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+
= =  
(21) 
where stdT  is the transmittance of SMF fibre with attenuation coefficient stdα  = 0.2dB/km and 
lowT  is transmittance of the low loss reference pulse channel with an attenuation coefficient 
lowα  < stdα . The available phase excess noise tolerance that Eve can account for by the attack 
can be evaluated as:  
2 ( )* /10
1 1
* * (1 )
10 std low
std attack tot
tole esti esti A L
Ref
V
E α α
χξ ξ ξ
−
+
= − = −  (22) 
Here, we assume the length L of the quantum channel and reference channel are equal. 
Based on the value lowα   of the reference channel and channel length L, Eve can increase her 
attack, for example, by tuning the splitting factor in intercept and resend attack, until the 
additional excess noise attackeξ    equals toleξ . Hence, under the scope of reference pulse attack, 
the totξ  estimated by Alice and Bob including calibrated phase noise is unchanged and 
expressed as: 
attack
tot e e phase tole drift AM ADCξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ= + + − + + +    (23) 
As explained earlier, the first two noise terms ( attacke eξ ξ+ ) are attributed to Eve’s attack on 
the signal while the last two terms ( phase toleξ ξ− ) represent the phase noise linked to the 
reference pulse. Under the reference pulse attack, the quadrature values measured by Bob, Eq. 
(7), can be rewritten as: 
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 (24) 
Here, the phase estimator ߮ோ௉஺ෟ	is more accurate than one in Eq.(7). The most powerful 
impact of our attack is the applicability on every LLO-CVQKD configuration as long as 
phase estimation error noise is trusted. Attack creates excess noise tolerance and information 
leakage to Eve without being noticed. Even 100% secret key can be gained by Eve through 
this attack. In the following section, we estimate Eve’s gain in secure key information during 
the attack.  
3.3 Secret key analysis under attack  
In this section,  we compare the  mutual information and Holevo bound among the estimated 
values  in trusted model without attack (ܫ஺஻ and ߯஻ா) , with attack ( ܫ஺஻௘௦௧ and ߯஻ா௘௦௧ )  and actual 
information access by Eve  in trusted model under  attack (߯஻ா௔௧௧௔௖௞  ). Based on eq. (23), the 
total noise estimated by Alice and Bob after attack,	߯௧௔௧௧௔௖௞, is identical to the ‘no’ attack 
situation	χ୲ in untrusted model. This indicates that the attack, as in Eq. (13), does not affect 
the mutual information between Alice and Bob which can be referred to as: 
 
I୅୆ = logଶ
ܸ + ߯௧௢௧
1 + ߯௧௢௧ = logଶ
ܸ + ߯௧௔௧௧௔௖௞
1 + ߯௧௔௧௧௔௖௞
= I୅୆௘௦௧ (25) 
Similarly, with pre-calibrated phase estimation error noise, Alice and Bob are unable to 
discover the individual change of estiξ  and driftξ as long as the total added noise totξ  remains 
the same. Therefore, two users still employ previous noise values for Eve’s information 
estimation where ߯௛௘௧௘௦௧ = ߯௛௘௧ and߯௟௜௡௘௘௦௧ = ߯௟௜௡௘, hence	߯஻ா௘௦௧ = ߯஻ா . However, the actual line 
and detector noise terms through attack can be expressed as: 
 
߯୦ୣ୲ୟ୲୲ୟୡ୩ =
ሾ1 + (1 − ߟ) + 2ܸ݈݁݁ሿ
ߟ + ܶ( estiξ − toleξ ) (26) 
 
߯୪୧୬ୣୟ୲୲ୟୡ୩ =
1
ܶ − 1 + eξ + driftξ + AMξ + ADCξ + attackeξ      (27) 
where excess noise attackeξ    equals toleξ . 
As a result, following the exact procedure from Eq. (14) to Eq. (20) in the trusted phase 
noise model, Eve’s gain in information ߯஻ா௔௧௧௔௖௞  is greater than ߯஻ா௘௦௧  due to her additional 
attack on the signal. This leads to	߯஻ாோ௉஺ > ߯஻ா௘௦௧ = ߯஻ா. 
Here we define the efficiency of the reference pulse attack as the ratio of the original 
secure information leaked to Eve with and without attack: 
ܭ௘௙௙ =
߯஻ா௔௧௧௔௖௞ − χ୆୉ୣୱ୲
ܫ஺஻௘௦௧ − χ୆୉ୣୱ୲  
(28) 
The following section reports the results of the phase noise reduction due to attack and 
efficiency of the attack under different LLO-CVQKD system conditions.  
 
4. Performance Analysis 
4.1 Excess noise tolerance  
We investigate the attack performance as a function of various reference channel attenuation 
factors,	ߙ௟௢௪, ranging from the vacuum channel (0dB/km) to conventional SMF (0.2dB/km). 
We also consider a practical scenario where the reference channel uses recently reported 
hollow-core fibre of 0.14dB/km attenuation coefficient [30]. The simulation parameters are 
designated as the same as in Sec 2.2  to provide optimal performance. Values are expressed in 
shot noise units. 
 
Fig. 5. Phase noise with (blue dashed line) and without (red dashed line) attack variation at 
different reference path attenuation coefficient. Excess noise tolerance is generated by attack. 
Simulations are performed in the collective attack and V୅=4, Eୖୣ୤ଶ /V୅ = 100 and	L = 20	km. 
According to the Eq. (22), the phase excess noise tolerance increases with increase in 
transmission distance, decrease in reference path’s attenuation coefficient, and drop with the 
reference pulse intensity. However, the too large reference pulse intensity also has negative 
impact on key rate as we discussed previously. In normal case, Alice and Bob will pick the 
optimal reference pulse intensity without the consideration of our attack. Consequently, we 
investigate our attack performance at the optimal reference intensity. Fig. 5 shows the 
variation in phase excess noise tolerance with different attenuation coefficients of the 
reference channel for a 20 km LLO-CVQKD link at 	୉౎మ୚ఽ = 100  . Attack works for any 
channel attenuation factor and the phase noise reduces by 60.2% and 24.1% from the initial 
value, for 	α୪୭୵ = 0dB/km and 0.14dB/km reference channels, respectively. 
 Fig.6 shows the variation in mutual information as a function of transmission distance,	 
with optimal reference pulse intensity, under trusted phase noise model. The ߯஻ா௔௧௧௔௖௞ values 
are only evaluated for theoretical minimum α୪୭୵ = 0	dB/km (blue dashed line) and practical 
minimum 0.14	dB/km (red dashed line). 	߯஻ா௘௦௧ , is evaluated with reference path attenuation 
coefficient  αୱ୲ୢ =  0.2	dB/km  (purple solid line) under the notion that the attack is 
undetectable to Alice and Bob so channel attenuation coefficient for signal and reference 
channels are equal. The mutual information between Alice and Bob, I୅୆ (black solid line), 
monotonically decreases as a function of channel length. The secure region under attack is 
labelled as the truly secure region while the yellow region is the insecure region estimated by 
Alice and Bob with and without attack. The white region referred as the attack induced 
insecure region where Eve is successful in her attack without revealing her presence.  At 
relatively long distances, this grows rapidly which indicates an increase in attack efficiency. 
We need to emphasize that the ܭ௘௙௙ value varies with system parameters and a 100% insecure 
key situation can be achieved, especially at long transmission distance. It is noted that the 
achievable secure distance under trusted noise model without attack is 99.1km. Attack with 
lossless reference channel, unity attack efficiency reduces it to 23.8km. In more practical 
sense, the maximum transmission distance is reduced to 32.0km in reference channel with 
0.14dB/km loss. This indicates significant attack impact in the practical LLO CVQKD 
systems.    
 
Fig. 6. Mutual information in realistic model vs channel lengths. Insecure region expands with 
increase in transmission distance.  Zero-loss (vacuum) channel maximize the information gain 
by Eve. 100% attack efficiency is achieved from 23.8km and 32.0 km for 0 and 0.14 dB/km 
attenuation factors. 
Fig.7 compares the performance of the untrusted phase noise LLO-CVQKD system 
performance with the trusted LLO-CVQKD system under reference pulse attack, at 20km 
transmission distance. At 20km there is no secure key generation possible for untrusted noise 
LLO-CVQKD system. However, we use this situation to show merits of trusted noise model.  
In Fig.7(a), for untrusted phase noise model, it shows the χ୆୉ is greater then   I୅୆ that lead to 
zero key rate.  On the other hand, for trusted phase noise model, Fig.7(b), since the calibrated 
estiξ  is excluded from excess noise estimation, the mutual information between Alice and Bob  
I୅୆  is always stays higher than Eves’ information upper bound. However, the attack on 
reference pulse increase the Holevo bound for Eve’s information which estimated by Alice 
and Bob as ߯஻ா௘௦௧(blue dashed line) but, accounts to ߯஻ா௔௧௧௔௖௞ (red dashed line). This creates an 
attack-induces insecure region. Quantitatively, at a 20 km distance and for 0dB/km 
attenuation coefficient for the reference channel, Eve can extract 48.6% of the secret key 
without the attack being identified. For a feasible 0.14 dB/km attenuation coefficient, Eve can 
achieve 23.2% additional information.  The attack reduces the key rate, however, there exist 
at secure region that sill can be exploited for key generation. This indicates the potentiality of 
trusting the phase noise   to improve key rate as well as transmission distance. The feasibility 
of trusted phase noise model is investigated in next section.  
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